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THE LEGALITY OF SO-CALLED "BUSINESS
INSURANCE"
In view of the comparatively modern but increasingly common
practice of writing insurance for the benefit of those who maintain
towards one another a business relationship, whether as between
a corporation and its officers or stockholders, debtor and creditor,
or copartners, the subject of the legality of such insurance and
the advantages which may be derived therefrom becomes of
great interest to the business world.
In a striking article contributed to the "Life Association News"
for November, 1914, Mr. Charles W. Scovel says:
"Business insurance is as yet a new idea to most busi-
ness men. By its novel uses it interests at once many
who are 'not in the market' when approached for per-
sonal insurance. It is spreading like wildfire. Scores
of millions have been, written during the last few years.
Big corporations have been taking amounts ranging as
high as $I,5OO,OOO on a single officer."
The first question which presents itself to the mind is whether
such insurance is valid, whether in such cases that insurable
interest which the law requires exists. The general principle
is stated by a prominent text writer as follows :1
"A person may procure insurance on the life of another
when he is so related to that other by reason of blood,
marriage, or commerce that he has well grounded expecta-
tions of deriving benefit from the continuation of that
other's life, or of suffering detriment or incurring liability
through its termination" (p. 125).
"Commercial Relations. Any person is permitted to
protect by insurance any commercial interest he may
possess in the life of another. A creditor may insure the
life of his debtor, a partner that of his copartner, or a
servant the life of his master. And a master may insure
his servant against such injuries in the course of his
employment as will impose liability on the master. The
life of a contractor under obligation to construct any
work may be insured by his employer, and persons
pecuniarily interested in any financial enterprise may
insure the life of the financier who has charge of it. The
'Vance On Insurance.
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life of one only indirectly connected with a commercial
enterprise may be insured by those involved in it if the
death of such person would injuriously affect the enter-
prise, as in the recent instances of insurance on the life
of the King of England procured by those who had
invested money in preparations for the King's coronation.
So a tenant per autre vie might well insure the life of his
cestui que vie; and one who owns a property interest con-
tingent upon another's attaining some specified age may
through insurance secure indemnity for the loss he would
suffer by the death of that other before arriving at that
age. A surety may insure the life of his principal, for
the latter is but a conditional debtor, but the principal
has no such interest in the life of his surety. Likewise
it has been held that a building association has no insur-
able interest in the life of a member who is in no wise
indebted to it."
Corporation Insurance.
The paucity of authority on the question of the validity of
insurance taken out by a corporation on the lives of its officers,
stockholders or employees is surprising. An examination of the
books on the subject of insurance will disclose that works as
modem as Cyc., The American and English Encyclopedia of
Law, Cooley's Briefs On the Law of Insurance, and Vance
On Insurance contain no mention of such insurance.
Nevertheless, such insurance is believed to be valid, not only
as answering a patent business need but as coming well within
that rule of law which requires an insurable interest. A pains-
taking examination of the authorities has brought to light only
a few cases dealing with this subject. Because of the smallness
of the number of cases and their importance, it is proposed to
examine them separately and in chronological order.
The earliest decision was the case of Trinity College v. Trav-
elers' Insurance Company.2 Trinity College was supported by
the Methodist Church. It procured an individual member of
such church to insure his life for its benefit, itself paid all the
premiums, including the first, and received the policy. It was
not shown that the insured himself had ever given the college
anything or that he was likely to. Under such circumstances,
it was very properly held that the college had no insurable
interest, though some of the language of the opinion is much too
broad.
113 N. C. 244, i8 S. E. 175 (decided Oct. 31, 1893).
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The next decision was by the Virginia Court of Appeals in
the case of Tate v. Commercial Building Association.3 In this
case a building association was held to have no insurable interest
in the life of a stockholder not indebted to it. It was not
shown that the stockholder was an officer of the association
or actively engaged in promoting its business. Nor did it appear
that his connection with the association in any way improved its
credit. The bare question was presented as to whether his mere
status as a stockholder gave to the association an insurable
interest in his life. It was decided that it did not.
The present opinion of the Virginia Court on this question of
business insurance is shown by the decision in Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Board, infra.
Four years later the New Hampshire Supreme Court had the
problem presented to it in the case of Mechanics' National Bank
v. "Comins.4 Here a bank was a heavy creditor of the George T.
Comins Company (presumably a corporation). One George
T. Comins was its manager. He took out a policy on his life
and assigned- same to the bank. The court, as to its decision
on this point, proceeded on the theory that the policy was taken
out for the purpose of assignment and was, therefore, invalid
unless the bank had an insurable interest in the life of the
insured. The question was thus presented as to whether one
having no interest in a corporation, other than an indebtedness
owed him by such corporation, can insure the life of the manager
of such corporation. It was held that such insurance was valid.
The court uses the following language:
"It is hardly necessary to say that the success of a
corporate enterprise may be so interwoVen with the per-
sonality of its manager that its stock is taken, and money
is loaned to carry it on, as much in reliance upon that
personality as upon the intrinsic merit of the enterprise;
and no reason appears why a stockholder or creditor,
the value of whose investment may be reasonably said to
depend upon the life or health of the man at the helm,
should not have an insurable interest in his life, the same
as one who invests money in a partnership, relying upon
the skill or experience of his copartner, has an insurable
interest in the life of the latter, or one who equips a
mining expedition has an insurable interest in the life
'97 Va. 74, 33 S. E. 382, 45 L. R. A. 243, 75 Am. St. Rep. 770 (decided
Apr. 6, 1899).
'72 N. H. 12, 55 AtI. 191, ioi Am. St. Rep. 650 (decided in Jan., 19o3).
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of him to whom its management is committed. The
creditor or stockholder, under such circumstances, would
seem to have that 'reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit or profit from the continuance of another's life'
which is held sufficient to constitute an insurable interest.
In such case 'the essential thing . . . that the policy
should be obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose
of speculating upon the hazards of life' would appear to
be present. In this view we are not prepared to say, as
matter of law, . . . that the plaintiffs, who were fur-
mishing the funds to carry on the business of the George
T. Comins Company, had no insurable interest in the life
of George T. Comins, the manager, and apparently the
originating and directing personality in the enterprise.5
The next case, Victor v. Louise Cotton Mills," arose in North
Carolina. One Wilson was the president of a cotton mill. He
was a manufacturer and financier of great capacity, skill and
ability. His services to the cotton mill of which he was presi-
dent were conceded to be of great and peculiar value, and such
services as could be performed by him only. Wilson insured
his life in favor of the cotton mill for $iooooo and assigned
the policies to the mill, which paid the first and all subsequent
premiums thereon. Afterwards the said Wilson severed his con-
nection with the mill company, but said company continued to
keep the policies of insurance in force. One of the stockholders
of the cotton mill, being discontented with the large premiums
which the company was continuing to pay, and fearing that the
policy was invalid, brought suit to enjoin the cotton mill from
paying any further premiums on the policy. The court, without
deciding the question of insurable interest, held that the con-
tinued payment of the premiums after Wilson had severed his
connection with the mill was ultra vires, and enjoined it from
continuing to pay the premiums. Great stress was laid on the
fact that Wilson was no longer connected with the mill. The
5In a note written in i9o8, in 16 L. R. A. (N. S.), io2o, the above
case is commented on as follows: "The statements in the foregoing
case in regard to stockholders are dicta, as the person seeking to collect
the insurance was a creditor, and not a stockholder. But if that view
of the law is correct, it would seem that a corporation would also have
an insurable interest in the life of an important officer, as the interest
of the corporation would be no more remote than that of a stockholder,
and certainly would be greater in extent."
6148 N. C. io7, 61 S. E. 648, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) io2o, 16 Ann. Cases,
291 (decided May 29, 198o).
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language of the court, however, indicates that it considered such
insurance bad business policy anyway. This case was decided
on general principles, the court admitting that neither the court
nor counsel had been able to find a case in point.
This case might seem not to militate against the view that
such insurance is valid so long as the insured official retains his
connection with the corporation. But in the case of Victor v.
Chadwick Mfg. Company,7 decided on the same day as the Louise
Cotton Mills Case, the fact was that the insured still retained his
office and was the president of the defendant manufacturing
corporation, and yet the court held such insurance to be ultra
vires, and said "this fact does not affect the result.""
S148 N. C. xxg, 61 S. E. 653.
* In a note to Victor v. Louise Cotton Mills, supra, written in I9o8, in
16 L. R. A. (N. S.), Io2o, it is said by the annotator: "There appears
to be no other reported case involving the power of a corporation to pay
with corporate funds the premiums on a life insurance policy carried
on the life of one of its officers for the benefit of the corporation. In the
foregoing case the relations between the officer whose life had been
insured and the corporation had been severed, and although the court
plainly implied that it did not believe the fact would make any difference,
yet it is quite possible that such a distinction might be made were the
case to come up in the other form in another court." He also says:
"Nor does there appear to be any other reported case which directly
passes upon the question whether a corporation has an insurable inter-
est in the life of its president or any other of its officers."
This Cotton Mills Case is also annotated in 16 Ann. Cases, 295. This
note was written in 19io. This annotator says: "A careful search dis-
closes but few cases passing upon the right of a corporation to insure
the lives of its officers."
He then cites Victor v. Chadwick Mfg. Co., supra, Mechanics' Nat.
Bank v. Comins, supra, Tate v. Bldg. Ass'n., supra, and Trinity College
v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra. The only new case he cites is one decided
in i9o8 by an Ohio Circuit Court. He comments on this as follows:
"It has been held that a corporation organized for the purpose of manu-
facturing cooperage has no right to give its promissory note for the
purpose of carrying insurance on the lives of its directors. Security
Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. I. M. Schott, etc., Co., 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 656,
affirming 19 Ohio Dec. 249, wherein it was said: 'The insurant under
each of the five policies was not indebted to the company, and under no
obligation to it other than as stockholder, director or manager. The
company was not investing surplus funds, but was incurring an obligation
through its secretary and manager, without the assent of the board of
directors, for the purpose of securing a policy of insurance for five
thousand dollars on each of five directors, an object wholly foreign to
its incorporation. While it is true, as suggested by counsel, that each
YALE LAW JOURNAL
But the Supreme Court of Ohio, in the subsequent case of
Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Company,9 reaches a different con-
clusion. That case was as follows:
Thomas J. Gainor was employed (in what capacity does
not appear) by, and was a large stockholder in, The
Coshocton Glass Company, a corporation. By reason of
his skill and experience, he was largely relied upon to
make the business of the corporation a success. In estab-
lishing itself in business the company was a large borrower
of money and it also sold preferred stock to raise work-
ing capital. In order to secure against loss or failure of
the enterprise and to maintain the credit of the company,
Gainor took out a policy of insurance on his own life
payable to the company, the policy was delivered to the
company, and the company paid the first and all subsequent
premiums on the policy. Gainor represented to creditors
of the glass company and to banks from which he was
seeking to and did procure loans for said company, and
to persons whom he sought to induce and did induce to
become purchasers of stock in said company, that this
policy of insurance belonged to and was assets of said
glass company. Before Gainor's death he sold his stock
and severed all connection with the glass company. On
his death his executors and the glass company both
claimed the insurance, the former on the ground that the
company had no insurable interest in Gainor's life. The
insurance company paid the money into court. The court
awarded the money to the glass company, holding: (i)
It did have an insurable interest in Gainor's life. On this
point the court said: "It thus distinctly appearing that
the company had a direct pecuniary interest in the life
and personal services of Gainor, the insurance for the
benefit of the company was based on an insurable interest
and was valid"; (2) That the policy, being valid when
issued, did not lapse when Gainor severed his connections
with said company; a life insurance contract is not a
mere contract of indemnity "but is a contract to pay to
the beneficiary a certain sum of money in the event of
insurant might have taken out a policy, paid the premium, and made
the corporation the beneficiary, yet in this case the applicant incurs no
liability, and it is. expressly agreed that the corporation shall pay all
premiums, and did execute and deliver its note for the first two annual
premiums. We think that the company had no insurable interest in its
directors, and if it did that the secretary and manager was unauthor-
ized to enter into the contract without the assent of the board of
directors."
'86 Oh. St. 213, 99 N. E. 299, 29 Ann. Cases, 607 (decided June 5,
1912).
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death"; (3) That even if the company had no insurable
interest "there is abundant authority for holding that
when the insurer has recognized the validity of the policy
by paying the amount of the policy to the beneficiary, or
into court, other parties claiming an interest in the fund
cannot object on the ground that the beneficiary named
in the policy had no insurable interest."
The latest decision seems to have been that of the Virginia
Supreme Court in the case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Board,10
decided January 15, 1914. In that case one B. F. Board was the
principal incorporator, president and general manager of the
Board, Armstrong & Company Corporation, a Virginia corpora-
tion. He procured from the Mutual Life Ins. Company of New
York a policy on his life, payable to the corporation. Both the
application and the policy stated that the interest of the bene-
ficiary in the insured was "loss of services in the event of death."
The company paid the first premium. On Board's death the
insurance company contested the payment of the policy on the
ground of a lack of insurable interest in the corporation, and
because the contract on the part of the corporation was ultra
vires. The court overruled both of these objections, holding that
the contract of insurance was not ultra vires, and that the cor-
poration had an insurable interest in Board's life. In passing
on the question of ultra vires, nothing is said about the North
Carolina cases, and the court decides the question of insurable
interest mainly from general principles and business policy,
though Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Comins, supra, and Keckley v.
Coshocton Glass Co., supra, are quoted from at length and
approved. In reaching its conclusion, the court says:
"The deceased was the president and manager of the
corporation, and had been since its organization. His
relation to and knowledge of the financial and manufac-
turing interests of the plaintiff was such that his death
could not fail to result in serious and substantial loss
to its creditors and all others interested in its prosperity.
Although it is well known that the leading insurance com-
panies of the country solicit and carry the class of insur-
ance here involved, we have been unable to find any
decision directly in point. The principles, however,
announced by the decisions and stated by the text-writers
we think clearly show that the plaintiff had an insurable
interest in the life of B. F. Board, its president and
general manager."
0 115 Va. 836, 80 S. E. 565.
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In the companion case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York
v. Board Motor Truck Company Corporation, decided on the
same date, and reported with the case just commented on, a
similar conclusion is reached by the Virginia court.
It is believed that the true rule on this subject is the one
announced by the Virginia court in the cases last mentioned, and
that it is entirely legitimate for a corporation to take out insur-
ance on the lives of its officers or employees in every case where
the death of such officer or employee would probably cause a
financial loss. This view is certainly consonant with the general
rule of the law of insurance as to what constitutes an insurable
interest. It is further believed that such contracts on the part
of a corporation are not ultra vires. It was so held expressly
by the Virginia court, in the cases above cited, and the case
from Ohio is implied authority for the same proposition, inas-
much as no question seems to have existed in the mind of the
court on this proposition. North Carolina is the only court, so
far, holding the contrary doctrine.
The business considerations rendering such insurance desirable,
and the practical benefits derived from it by a corporation, are
fully shown in the article by Mr. Scovel, above mentioned. He
condenses an elaborate argument as to the benefits to be derived
from such insurance into the following summary:
"Business life insurance renders six services. During
life, it (i) immediately fortifies financial standing, and
(2) gradually builds up emergency cash. At death, it
supplies spot cash as indemnity (3) for direct loss, and
(4) for consequential damage; -and spot cash to help (5)
in replacing the dead man, and (6) in readjusting every-
thing to the new conditions. And the bulk of the premiums
is not money spent, but money laid aside."
These business considerations, combined with the tremendous
use being made of it now by corporations, are strong practical
reasons for upholding its validity, and will doubtless have much
influence with the courts.
Creditors' Insurance.
Such insurance may take three forms:
(a) The creditor may himself take out the policy on the
debtor's life;
(b) The debtor, in pursuance of an agreement with the
creditor who pays the premiums, may take a policy
on his own life and assign it to the creditor;
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(c) The debtor, having a valid policy on his own life
taken out for his own benefit, may assign same
to the creditor as collateral security; or he may
assign absolutely, or sell, such policy to the cred-
itor, or to anyone else.
Where a creditor takes out insurance on his debtor's life, or
a debtor, in pursuance of an agreement with the creditor who
pays the premiums, takes a policy on his own life and assigns
it to the creditor, the transaction in both cases is held valid,
because the creditor has an insurable interest in the debtor's life.
But there exists a conflict in the decisions as to how much
of the proceeds of the policy the creditor is entitled to keep in
such cases. One view, and it is thought the better in point of
reason, treats such proceeds as belonging entirely to the creditor,
and this even though the debt has been paid in full before the
death of the insured. This is on the theory that a policy valid
when issued continues valid, although the insurable interest may
thereafter cease. The other view, and this view seems to be
sustained by the weight of authority, holds that the creditor in
such cases can retain the proceeds only to the extent of the debt
and such advancements as are subsequently made in pursuance
of the assignment, together with any expenses incurred on
account of the policy itself by the creditor. These cases proceed
on the theory of indemnity."'
Of course, where the debtor simply assigns to the creditor
his policy as collateral security the creditor has a right to be
reimbursed his debt, with interest and expenses, and nothing
more.
12
But where the debtor assigns absolutely his own valid policy
to a creditor, that is he sells it to him, the latter may keep it
alive and recover the full amount of the policy, irrespective of
the debt.13
Vance On Insurance, pp. 127, 410-412. This writer favors the minor-
ity rule, and cites as sustaining it the courts of England, Indiana, New
York, Pennsylvania and Vermont. In a note in 22 Anno. Cases, 653, the
courts sustaining the majority rule are said to be those of the United
States, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Canada;
those sustaining the minority rule, Louisiana and Maryland.
12 3 Am. & Eng. Encl. Law, p. 952; Vance On Insurance, pp. 412-413.
"3 Am. & Eng. Encl. Law, p. 952; Vance On Insurance, pp. 412-413;
Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U. S. 149, 32 Sup. Ct. 58.
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And this last proposition is true whether the policy be assigned
to the creditor or to any other person, for it is held by the great
weight of authority that a policy of life insurance, taken out in
good faith and valid in its inception, may be thereafter freely
assigned to anyone, whether the assignee have an insurable inter-
est or not.
4
The Virginia Court, among others, for some time seemed to be
committed to the doctrine that it was just as necessary for an
assignee of a valid policy to have an insurable interest as it
would have been had such assignee originally sought himself to
take out such insurance on another's life.'5 But the question is
now settled by statute in Virginia in favor of the doctrine above
stated 6 and the trend of decision even in those states which
originally held to the contrary doctrine is to reverse their holdings
and gef in line with the great majority of the decisions.' 7
Partnership Insurance.'
This form of insurance in this country seems to have had its
origin in the days of the California gold fever. It was then
common for a person who remained in the east to send an
argonaut into California, equip him, advance him money, agree
for a share in any possible discoveries of gold, and then, to make
himself safe, take out insurance on the prospector's life.' 9
The leading case on the right of a partner to insure the life
of his copartner is Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs.20
In this case the Supreme Court of the United States, in holding
that one partner had an insurable interest in the life of the
other, said:
"Certainly Luchs had a pecuniary interest in the life
of Dillenberg on two grounds: because he was his
creditor and because he was his partner. The continuance
"Vance On Insurance, 14o-144; Note in 27 Anno. Cases, 864; Grigsby
v. Russell, supra.
"Roller v. Moore/s Adm'r., 86 Va. 512, 1o S. E. 241; Tate v. Com-
inercial Bldg. Ass'n, 97 Va. 74, 33 S. E. 382.
"Code of Va. §2959a.
"Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 67 S. E. 767.
" The general rule as to such insurance is stated in the quotation made
from Vance On Insurance, supra.
"Morrell v. Trenton M. L. & F. Ins. Co., o Cush. (Mass.) 282, 57
Am. Dec. 92; Trenton M. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Yohnson, 24 N. J. L.
576; Bevin v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244.
o0 18 U. S. 498, 27 L. Ed. 80o, 2 Sup. Ct. 949 (decided in 1883).
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of the partnership, and, of course, a continuance of Dil-
lenberg's life, furnished a reasonable expectation of
advantage to himself. It was in the expectation of such
advantage that the partnership was formed, and, of
course, for the like expectation, was continued."
It is at the present day well settled that the partnership rela-
tion gives to a copartner, or to the partnership itself, an insurable
interest in the life of any one of the individual partners, though
there are not as many cases as one would expect on the subject.
2 1
In the recent case of Rahdus, Merrett & Hagler v. Peoples
Bank,22 a partnership of three were conducting business. The
lives of the several members were insured by the copartnership,
for the benefit of the firm, in the sum of $5000 on the life of
each partner. All of the premiums on the policies taken out
on the lives of the members were paid by the partnership as an
expense of its business, and the policies so taken out were
delivered to and kept in the possession of the partnership. Later
on this partnership incorporated, and the policies were assigned
by the partnership to the corporation, which later paid one
premium. One of the partners died, and a contest arose between
his administrator and the corporation as to who should get the
proceeds of the policy. The administrator contended that there
was no insurable interest in the two other members of the part-
nership at the time that the policies were issued and that, if
there was an insurable interest, it became extinguished on the
formation of the corporation. Both of these contentions were
overruled by the court, and the proceeds awarded to the corpora-
tion. The court says: "Each member of a copartnership cer-
tainly has an interest in the continuance of the lives of his
copartners, growing out of the partnership relation. The
necessities of the business incur more or less liability, which
might be serious financially if one were removed by death." As
to the administrator's second contention, it was held that the
assignment to the corporation was valid. 2
An interesting view of partnership insurance was announced
in Texas in the case of Cheeves v. Anders.23 There a partner-
2L 25 Cyc. 706, 707; 3 Am. & Eng. Encl. Law, 955; Note in 22 Anno.
Cases, 299.
= 13 Minn. 496, 13o N. W. I6. For an instructive case in harmony
with the above see Rush v. Howkins, 135 Ga. 128, 68 S. E. io35 (decided
Sept. 22, igIo).
'87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (decided Nov., 1894).
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ship consisting of two partners took out a $io,ooo policy of
insurance on the life of each partner, payable to the firm. The
premiums were paid by the firm. Before the death of either
partner, the firm was dissolved, one of the partners taking over
all firm assets and assuming all firm liabilities. After such
dissolution the outgoing partner died, and a contest for the
insurance arose between his administrator and the surviving
partner. It was held that the policy was originally valid, but
that the insurable interest of the partner who continued the busi-
ness ceased upon the dissolution of the partnership, and he should
be allowed to recover only the premiums paid by the firm, the
administrator of the deceased partner getting the residue.
This case is against the weight of authority as to the last
proposition. It is settled law in a great majority of the states
that an insurable interest need only exist at the time of the
taking out of a life policy, and that a subsequent loss of such
interest on the part of the beneficiary does not invalidate the
policy. If it were held that a partner had an insurable interest
in his copartners only while he occupied the position of creditor,
and that the insurance was solely allowed on the theory of
creditor's insurance, then the case would be in line with those
decisions which refuse to allow a creditor to collect any more
insurance money than will indemnify him. But it is thought
that the insurable'interest of a partner rests on other considera-
tions, and that the general rule that if such insurance is valid
when taken out it is valid always should be held to apply. These
creditor's cases rest on the mistaken theory that a policy of
life insurance is merely a contract of indemnity,
24 and, even
where this rule obtains, it should be confined to its own narrow
limits. Certainly this is true if the rule announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States be correct, that a woman
who obtains a policy on her husband's life does not lose its
benefit and may collect the insurance even though she be after-
wards divorced from her husband and marries another man.
25
The only State not adopting the rule as stated appears to be
North Carolina. It was there held that "under certain condi-
tions a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his
copartner. '26 But in the later case of Powell v. Mutual Benefit
"See Vance On Insurance, pp. 127, 410.
" Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaffer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. Ed.
251.
" Trinity College z. Ims. Co., II3 N. C. 244, i8 S. E. 175.
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Life Insurance Co.,2 7 this was admitted to be true only where
the relation of debtor and creditor existed, and the court decided
that the mere partnership relation, without a showing that the
insured partner was indebted to the other or was to furnish any
labor, skilled or otherwise, as his contribution in lieu of money,
did not in itself constitute an insurable interest.
This Powell Case has been overruled in so far as it held that
a life policy could only be assigned to one having an insurable
interest,28 and it may be that if the question were again presented
to the North Carolina Court it would follow the general rule
and make the decisions unanimous.
Forms Which Such Insurance May Take.
Such partnership insurance may be taken out in several differ-
ent ways. Suppose there is a partnership consisting of A, B,
and C, under the firm name of A & Company. Each partner
might insure his life for the benefit of the firm, the firm paying
the premiums 22 or each might insure his life for the benefit of
the other two, the firm paying the premiums. 2  By the first
method the insurance money, when collected, would be firm
assets, would be administered like any other firm assets, and
the executor or administrator of the deceased partner would
come in for his share of the insurance on an accounting
just as he would on any other assets. There would be no injus-
tice here, however, as it must be remembered that the deceased
partner had his interest in the premiums which the firm paid.
By the second method the proceeds of the policy would go to
the surviving partners individually and would not be firm assets
Consent Of The Life Insured.
It seems well to call attention here to a matter which seems
to be often overlooked, namely, that when one man insures
another's life the consent of the one whose life is insured should
be held to be a prerequisite on grounds of public policy. A
large practice has grown up to the contrary, and there is little
direct authority on the point. The law has been stated as
follows:
"While the practice of insurers makes the question
somewhat uncertain, it seems that both by reason and
123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 381, 68 Am. St. Rep. 88.
'Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 67 S. E. 767.
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authority insurance written upon the life of one who has
not consented thereto is contrary to public policy and
void."2 '
The Reasons Why Such Insurance Is Desirable.
The practical arguments in favor of the validity of corporation
insurance are forceably set forth by Mr. Charles W. Scovel in
his article referred to above. What the courts have said on the
subject of the desirability of such insurance is shown in the
quotations made above where the legality of such insurance as
applied to corporations was discussed. It will be noticed that
the courts have recognized such insurance to be advantageous.
The reasons why creditor's insurance is desirable are too
obvious to require much comment. It secures a direct, specific,
existing debt. It subserves the same purpose as a mortgage.
And, in those states where the creditor is allowed to keep the
policy alive even after the debt has been paid and is allowed
to collect and retain the whole face of the policy, it possesses an
additional and legitimate speculative advantage.
Every reason which may be advanced for taking out corpora-
tion insurance applies with equal or greater force to partnership
insurance. In addition, there are many arguments in favor of
the latter insurance which apply not at all to the former. This
difference arises from the difference in the nature of the two
forms of business organization.
A corporation has two main characteristics which make the
business world look upon it with much favor. The first is the
non-liability of the stockholders in any personal way for the
corporation's obligations. The second is the continued existence
of the corporation in spite of the death or withdrawal of its
stockholders or officers. All may die, the stock may change
hands any number of times, but the corporation is in legal theory
a distinct entity, a legal person, and it continues to live.
On the other hand, a partnership possesses neither of the
above characteristics. Although, for business purposes, the
partners often look on the partnership as something distinct and
apart from the individuals composing it, yet, in the eyes of the
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law, this is not so. The law knows no such person, or entity,
as a partnership. The name is simply a convenient designation
for a co6perative and intimate form of business relationship in
which there exists a mutuality of ownership, a community of
interest, and a oneness in responsibility. Each partner is the
agent of the other, with power to place upon the other obliga-
tions, with power to wreck the business. So, during the life of
the partnership, there is an element of personal trust, personal
reliance, and business intimacy about the relation which does not
exist with respect to corporations. For example, not only the
partnership assets, but every cent of the private individual
property of each partner, is liable to the partnership creditors,
and this though the obligation may have been contracted by
one of the partners only without the other's knowledge or con-
sent. Then, again, a partnership is automatically brought to
a close by operation of law upon the happening of certain com-
mon and inevitable events. It can only live as long as all of
the partners live. Its existence ceases if a partner, while alive,
sells his stock and withdraws. And there is no way to keep
a partner from quitting if he wishes to do so. It is true that
by an agreement between the partners, or by the will of one
of the partners, it may be provided that the business shall go
on after a death. But, in legal contemplation, this is in every
case a new partnership. It is thus seen that every partnership
is necessarily and inevitably a creature of short life. It has
only as long to live as all partners keep alive. It may meet its
death at any time by the act of one in selling out, by his misconduct
rendering a further continuance of the business impossible, his
bankruptcy, his lunacy, or because the object for which the
partnership was formed has become impossible.
Of course, the main embarrassments incident to a dissolved
partnership arise when one of the partners dies. But the neces-
sary readjustment which must follow upon the withdrawal of a
living partner may prove to be a serious inconvenience and loss.
A new partnership must be formed. This may be done in a
mutually agreeable manner if there is no friction between the
remaining members of the firm and the outgoing partner. On
the contrary, if the retiring partner sells his interest to some
person who does not care to have the business go on and to par-
ticipate in it, such purchaser may call for an accounting and
have the business wound up. Insurance on the life of a partner
in such a case will not yet have matured. He is yet alive. But,
34
YALE LAW JOURNAL
even then, it may be a valuable asset, and according to the weight
of authority it will not lapse but the remaining partners may
keep it up and collect it as firm assets whenever the insured
dies. They had an insurable interest in the insured's life when
they took the policy out, and the subsequent loss of interest does
not invalidate the insurance. But the most frequent event which
causes trouble and loss to a partnership is the death of one of
the partners. And this is the case where, if there is insurance
on that partner's life, it is at once collectable and realizable
as an asset, as ready money, to keep off trouble and to prevent
loss.
If the survivors buy out the interest of the dead partner, this
takes ready money. If they have not this money, then the only
alternative is to wind up the partnership. The reason for this
is that the dead partner did not own any specific part of the firm
property which might be turned over to his representatives. His
interest is only what remains as his share in money after the firm
debts have been paid, the accounts between the partners and the
firm settled, and the stock sold.
Moreover, such sale would ordinarily have to be a public sale.
The remaining partners would usually not be permitted to buy
in his share privately. The courts will, under some circum-
stances, permit this, but there must first be a full accounting
and settlement to determine just what the interest of the dead
man is, and an agreement by his administrator or executor to sell;
and the courts will scrutinize such transactions with jealous
care. Suppose, again, that the firm has entered into a contract.
It may have relied primarily upon the dead partner to perform
the contract. His death makes this impossible. Yet his death
does not absolve the surviving partners from the obligation to
perform the contract. So, a partnership, and each member
thereof, is liable for a tort committed by any member of the
partnership in the partnership business, and if one of the partners
dies that does not keep the surviving partners from being
responsible, even though the dead man is the one who actually
committed the tort.
The death of the partner does not put off for any period the
right of his administrator or executor to sue the survivors for
an accounting, nor the right of the firm creditors to at once go
against the surviving partners for any debt that is due. But
generally, by statute, no debt is required to be paid by the
administrator or executor of the deceased partner until a more
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or less extended period has elapsed after his qualification as
such administrator or executor.
Upon the dissolution of the partnership by death of a partner,
title to the personal assets vests in the surviving partners as
trustees to wind up the business. It is the surviving partners'
duty to collect all claims and pay all debts and dispose of the
firm property to the best advantage, either as a whole, or in
parcels, as he deems best; and it is both his right and duty to
wind up the business as soon as possible, and, though he may
continue it for a short time to enable him to dispose of the firm
property, he cannot continue it indefinitely without the consent
of the representatives of the deceased partner. He is strictly
accountable for the firm property. He is not entitled to com-
pensation for ordinary services in winding up the partnership
business, though he is entitled to reimbursement for necessary
expensesa 0
All of the above considerations constitute strong practical
reasons for holding partnership insurance valid, as well as a
demonstration of its desirability as a prudent business investment.
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